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AGGREGATE REPRESENTATIONS OF AGGREGATE GAMES1
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David Martimort and Lars Stole
An aggregate game is a normal-form game with the property that each player’s payoff is
a function only of his own strategy and an aggregate function of the strategy profile of
all players. Aggregate games possess a set of purely algebraic properties that can often
provide simple characterizations of equilibrium aggregates without first requiring that one
solves for the equilibrium strategy profile. The defining nature of payoffs in an aggregate
game allows one to project the n-player strategic analysis of a normal form game onto
a lower-dimension aggregate-strategy space, thereby converting an n-player game to a
simpler object – a self-generating single-person maximization program. We apply these
techniques to a number of economic settings including competition in supply functions
and multi-principal common agency games with nonlinear transfer functions.
Keywords: Aggregate games, common agency, asymmetric informa-
tion, menu auctions.
1. INTRODUCTION
An aggregate game is a normal-form game with the property that each player’s
payoff is a function only of his own strategy and an aggregate function of the strategy
profile of all players. The Cournot quantity game is probably the best known example
of such a game (the aggregate for this game is the market supply) and was the mo-
tivation behind Selten’s (1970) initial treatment of aggregate games. More generally,
this class of games encompasses a broad category of strategic settings including pub-
lic goods games, common resource games, rent-seeking contests, cost sharing games,
team games, and patent races, to name a few.1 Strong comparative statics properties
are available in aggregate games if one makes additional assumptions on the rela-
tionship between the aggregate and each player’s strategy in the payoff functions.2
In addition, powerful existence theorems easily establish pure-strategy equilibria in
these games.3 That said, the aggregate games that have been typically analyzed have
been restricted to finite dimensional spaces and, more often than not, the aggregate
space is restricted to a single dimension.4
1The authors thank Karen Bernhardt-Walther, John Birge, Emir Kamenica, Dan Levin, David
Myatt, David Rahman, Michael Schwarz and seminar participants at the University of Chicago
and Ohio State University for helpful conversations and suggestions. The present version of this
paper consolidates many of the results in the previous working papers “A note on aggregate-strategy
games,” 2005 and “Tricks with aggregate games,” 2007.
aParis School of Economics-EHESS, david.martimort@parisschoolofeconomics.eu
bUniversity of Chicago Booth School of Business,lars.stole@chicagobooth.edu
1See Bergstrom, et al. (1986), Okuguchi (1993), Corchon (1994), Cornes and Hartley (2000, 2005),
Jensen (2009) and Acemoglu and Jensen (2009), and the many references cited therein.
2See in particular, Corchon (1994), Dubey, et al. (2006), and Acemoglu and Jensen (2009).
3See, for example, Szidarovszky and Yakowitz (1977), Novshek (1984, 1985), Kukushkin (1994,
2004), Dubey, et al. (2006), and Jensen (2009).
4Jensen (2009) and Acemoglu and Jensen (2009) briefly consider extensions to larger finite-
dimensional aggregates, but the powerful comparative statics and existence properties are com-
promised by the fact that assumptions of supermodularity and decreasing differences are less likely
to be satisfied in many applications that come to mind.
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In the games that are of direct interest to the present authors (e.g., competi-
tive agency games with nonlinear transfer functions), strategy spaces are infinite-
dimensional and payoffs are not supermodular. Nonetheless, aggregate games possess
a set of purely algebraic properties that can often provide simple characterizations
of equilibrium aggregates without requiring that one solve for the equilibrium strat-
egy profile. Mathematically, we demonstrate that the defining nature of payoffs in
an aggregate game allows one to embed the strategic analysis into the aggregate-
strategy space, converting an n-player game to a simpler object – a self-generating
single-person maximization program or, equivalently, a two-person, zero-sum game
over aggregates. The proofs of these properties are quite straightforward, following
directly from algebraic properties of the players’ payoffs. Nevertheless, this simple
projection of an aggregate game into the space of aggregate strategies allows us to
characterize the set of equilibrium aggregates without first solving for equilibrium
strategies. We demonstrate this usefulness in a series of examples.
2. AGGREGATE GAMES
As a starting point, consider any n-player normal for game defined by the player set
N = {1, . . . , n}, each player i’s strategy set, Xi, and each player i’s payoff function,
ui : X → R, where X ≡ X1 × · · · × Xn and x is an arbitrary profile in X. For
notational ease, we will use (xi,x−i) ∈ X to represent the decomposition of a strategy
profile into player i’s component and the remaining x−i strategy profile. Accordingly,
a strategy profile, x, is an equilibrium of a normal-form game if and only if for each
i ∈ N ,
ui(xi,x−i) ≥ ui(xi,x−i), ∀xi ∈ Xi.
An aggregate game is a normal-form game with the additional requirement that
each player i’s payoff can be represented as a function which depends only upon his
own strategy and an aggregate of the full strategy profile. Formally, we require that
there exists a proper5 aggregate φ : X → Y such that each player’s payoff function
can be further specialized to the aggregate form
x 7→ ui(xi, φ(x)).
We denote an aggregate normal-form game by the collection
G =
{
(Xi, ui)i∈N , φ
}
.
A defining characteristic of an aggregate game is that player i’s preference order-
ing over Xi is is invariant over the equivalence classes of X−i for which φ(xi,x−i) =
φ(xi,x
′
−i) for all xi ∈ Xi. At this stage in the analysis, the definition of an aggre-
gate game is abstract without any mathematical structure placed on the strategy
spaces, X, the aggregate space, Y , or the payoff functions (u1, . . . , un), other than
the existence of a common payoff aggregate. Even at this level of abstraction we
can state a few important properties of the equilibria set. Later, we will impose a
5We say that φ is a “proper” aggregate to mean that φ is not one-to-one; i.e., the aggregate
y = φ(x) does not identify a unique profile x but instead is a meaningful “aggregate” of x. If we did
not require such properness for φ, then every normal-form game would technically be an aggregate
game.
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linear-symmetric structure on strategies and payoffs, allowing us to characterize ad-
ditional details of equilibria. As we will see, the class of aggregate games satisfying
this additional linear-symmetric structure is quite large. We begin, however, with a
very concrete and well-known game for motivation.
Example 1 - Cournot games: Consider the output game of Cournot. Each of the n
firms simultaneously produces an output, qi ≥ 0, at a cost of Ci(qi) = ciq. The market
price is set such that total demand, D(p), is equal to the quantity supplied,
∑
i∈N qi.
In this case, using the the aggregate market supply, φ(q1, . . . , qn) =
∑
i∈N qi = Q, we
see that the Cournot game is also an aggregate game.6 Note that the aggregate we
chose is not unique. Any strictly monotone function of market output can also gener-
ate an aggregate game. In the present case, of course, such a transformed aggregate
game is isomorphic to the original.7 
In defining the class of aggregate games, we require that φ is a proper aggregate
of the profile x (i.e., φ is not one-to-one) so that the aggregate y cannot be used
to perfectly infer the profile, x. In many interesting aggregate games, however, we
have the additional property that for a given x−i, the aggregate y = φ(xi,x−i) can be
inverted to reveal player i’s strategy as a function of y. Such invertibility from Y to
Xi (if well defined) adds considerable power to the aggregate representation approach
we develop. There are a few related notions of invertibility which we define in turn.
For any given x−i, we can define the mapping of φ restricted to x−i by the function
φ(·,x−i) : Xi → Y . Inverting this mapping, we have a (possibly empty-valued)
correspondence
φ−1i (y,x−i) ≡ {xi ∈ Xi | y = φ(xi,x−i)}.
This inverse correspondence is non-empty for all (y,x−i) satisfying y ∈ φ(Xi,x−i),
where φ(Xi,x−i) is the image of Xi under φ restricted to x−i. If this inverse cor-
respondence is also single-valued for all y ∈ φ(Xi,x−i) and i ∈ N , we say that
φ is pairwise-injective. If φ is pairwise injective and also surjective on Y (i.e.,
φ(Xi,x−i) = Y ) for all x−i ∈ X−i and i ∈ N , then we say that φ is pairwise-
bijective. The techniques we develop for aggregate games will be especially fruitful
for games with pairwise-bijective aggregates.
Example 1 - Cournot games, continued: Returning to our Cournot game, the
aggregate function φ(q1, . . . , qn) =
∑
i qi is pairwise-injective and the inverse mapping
for each player i is φ−1i (Q,q−i) = Q−
∑
j 6=i qj. This aggregate is not pairwise-bijective,
however, because firm i’s output must be nonnegative, qi ≥ 0. Nonnegativity implies
that the aggregate which firm i can implement is constrained to be at least
∑
j 6=i qj.

Example 2 - Beauty contests:8 Another example of an aggregate game that is
pairwise injective but not pairwise bijective is a variation of Keynes’s beauty-contest
6Although these aggregates for the Cournot game are symmetric on their domains, symmetry is
not required in the definition of an aggregate game.
7More generally, one might imagine other normal-form games for which there are two proper
aggregate representations that are not isomorphic; we are unaware, however, of any such examples.
8We thank David Myatt for suggesting this example.
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game. Suppose that the true “beauty” of a person is random variable θ0 drawn from
a publicly known, prior distribution with convex support, Θ0 ⊂ R. Each player in
the game is an expert (a “ judge” in the beauty contest) who observes a private
signal, si ∈ Σi, which is informative about θ0 and the other players’ signals. Player
i’s strategy is a mapping from private signals to a public action or “prediction” of
θ0, which we denote as the announcement, xi(si). Player i cares both about being
correct (i.e., xi close to the true θ0) and about his closeness to the average assessment,
y = 1
n
∑
j xj.
Formally, player i’s strategy space is Xi = {x˜i | x˜i : Σi → Θ} and xi ∈ Xi is an
arbitrary strategy mapping signals to predictions. Denote the set of all signal profiles
by Σ ≡ ∏i∈N Σi and let s = (s1, . . . , sn) ∈ Σ represent an arbitrary signal profile.
Then the aggregate prediction space is the set of additively-separable mappings, s ∈
Σ 7→ y(s) ∈ Θ0:
Y ≡
{
y : Σ→ Θ
∣∣∣∣∣ ∃x ∈ X s.t. y(s) = 1n∑
i∈N
xi(si) , ∀ s ∈ Σ
}
.
Following Morris and Shin (2002), Angeletos and Pavan (2007) and Myatt and Wallace
(2008), we suppose that player i’s preferences are quadratic but with the additional
generality that the weights may vary across players.
ui(xi, y) = −
∫
Θ×Σ
(
(1− αi) (xi(si)− θ0)2 + αi (xi(si)− y(s))2
)
dG(θ0, s),
where G(θ0, s) is the joint cumulative distribution defined over Θ × Σ. Because the
average includes the player’s own assessment, we assume that each αi is bounded above
by n2/(2n−1) which guarantees that each player’s objective function is concave. This
upper bound exceeds unity and holds generally for any αi if n is sufficiently large;
there is no corresponding lower bound.9 Unlike these cited papers, we do not assume
that the information structure is Gaussian, nor do we require that αi ∈ (0, 1). For
example, αi < 0 characterizes a game in which player i prefers to be correct about θ
but also prefers to be unique relative to the “actions” of rival players.
The aggregate mapping φ(x) = 1
n
∑
i xi is pairwise injective because
xi = φ
−1(y,x−i) = ny −
∑
j 6=i
xj
is defined for y ∈ φ(Xi,x−i). The aggregate prediction is not pairwise bijective, how-
ever, as player i is restricted to implementing aggregates in the set φ(Xi,x−i) ( Y ,
which restricts the aggregate to coincide with x−i over the signals s−i. 
In contrast to the games of Cournot and beauty contests, the following two exam-
ples illustrate aggregate games with pairwise-bijective aggregates.
9If the player’s preferences were rewritten as only depending upon the average of other players’
reports, then this additional technical requirement on αi would be unnecessary; in such as case,
however, the game would not immediately be a member of the aggregate game class as we have defined
it and so we prefer to define the beauty contest game as an aggregate game from the beginning.
AGGREGATE GAMES 5
Example 3 - Supply function games: Consider the supply function game stud-
ied in Klemperer and Meyer (1989). Suppose that each of n firms chooses a supply
function as its strategy, Si : R+ 7→ R, where Si is a bounded function on the domain
of nonnegative prices mapping to the number of units firm i commits to supply at
the price p. We allow that supply commitments may be negative, which has the in-
terpretation of a net demand by the firm. Each firm chooses its supply function, Si,
prior to knowing the state of demand. We denote demand in state θ as D(p, θ). After
the supply functions are chosen and θ is realized, a market maker chooses the price
to equate supply to demand:
∑
i∈N Si(p) = D(p, θ).
10 The interesting aggregate in
this game is the derived market supply function, S(p) =
∑
i∈N Si(p). It is pairwise-
bijective because each firm is allowed to choose negative supply at any given price,
though in equilibrium we will see that no firm will choose to do so providing marginal
costs are nonnegative. 
Example 4 - Intrinsic common agency games: Common agency settings with
private information are another class of aggregate games with infinite-dimensional
strategy spaces.11 Each of n principals offer a nonlinear contract, Ti, i = 1, . . . , n,
which is a commitment by principal i to pay a common agent Ti(q) for any choice
q ∈ Q. The agent’s preference ordering over Q and monetary transfers, however,
is private information at the time of contracting, parameterized by θ ∈ Θ. In this
setting, each principal will typically gain from distorting the choice of q in order to
capture some of the agent’s information rent. In the simplest contracting game, we
assume that common agency is intrinsic: i.e., the agent must either accept all contract
offers, obtaining the aggregate transfer T (q) =
∑
i∈N Ti(q), or reject all contracts and
obtain a reservation payoff normalized to zero. Thus, the agent’s optimal choice of
q will be a function of θ and the aggregate transfer function, T =
∑
i Ti. Because
principals are allowed to demand payments from the agent (i.e., transfers may be
negative), the aggregate transfer function is a pairwise-bijection. 
3. CHARACTERIZING EQUILIBRIUM AGGREGATES
Let E(G) ⊆ X be the (possibly empty) set of Nash equilibrium strategy profiles
for the game G. Let EY (G) ⊆ Y be the corresponding set of aggregate equilibrium
outcomes:
EY (G) ≡ {y ∈ Y | y = φ(x), x ∈ E(G)} .
In this section, we present two closely related approaches to characterize the aggre-
gate equilibrium set EY (G) in aggregate-strategy games. The first characterization
result (Theorem 1) is built upon a principle of aggregate-strategy concurrence and
is broadly applicable to the entire class of aggregate games. A second collection of
stronger results (Corollaries 1 and 2) characterize EY (G) using various self-generating
maximization programs. These results, however, rely on an aggregate-invariance as-
sumption that is available only for a strict (but interesting) subset of aggregate games.
10To simplify the analysis, we assume that if no such price can be found, then no trade takes place.
11The case of intrinsic common agency in a moral hazard setting was first studied in Bernheim
and Whinston (1986a) with general contracts but finite outcomes, and later specialized to infinite-
dimensional (but linear) contracts by Holmstro¨m and Milgrom (1988) and Dixit (1996).
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3.1. Aggregate concurrence
Our first characterization is based on the notion that at an equilibrium profile
x ∈ E(G), each player i has the ability to implement any y ∈ φ(Xi,x−i) and therefore
must find y = φ(x) ∈ EY (G) to be optimal among all alternatives y ∈ φ(Xi,x−i).
Because y must satisfy similar optimality conditions for each player, in this sense
all players must concur over the choice of y. Indeed, this aggregate concurrence
requirement is both necessary and sufficient for y ∈ EY (G).
The key ingredient for the aggregate concurrence result is an observation about
best-response correspondences in aggregate games.
Lemma 1 For each player i ∈ N and x−i ∈ X−i,
xi ∈ arg max
x˜i∈Xi
ui(x˜i, φ(x˜i,x−i)) ⇐⇒
φ(xi,x−i) ∈ arg max
y∈φ(Xi,x−i)
{
max
x˜i∈φ−1i (y,x−i)
ui(x˜i, y)
}
.
From Lemma 1, we can characterize the set of equilibria using two-stage aggre-
gate best responses. This allows us to restate the definition of equilibrium as the
requirement that no player can improve his payoff by changing the aggregate. It
follows that the equilibrium aggregate, φ(x), must lie in the best-response correspon-
dence of every player (i.e., in the intersection of the players’ aggregate best-response
correspondences). Thus, x is a Nash equilibrium if and only if
φ(x) ∈
⋂
i∈N
arg max
y∈φ(Xi,x−i)
max
xi∈φ−1i (y,x−i)
ui(xi, y).
Notice we have not required that φ is pairwise injective. The preceding argument
suggests that in cases in which φ is not a pairwise-injection, we can nevertheless
project each player’s strategy space onto aggregate-equivalence sets and analyze the
game with the strategies chosen from the quotient set, Xi/∼, embedding the first step
of optimization into each player’s payoff function.12 If we are only interested in the
equilibrium aggregate, φ(x), and not the component strategies x, this reduction is
without any loss.
Collecting these results together, we have our first characterization theorem.
Theorem 1 If G = {(Xi, ui)i∈N , φ} is an aggregate-strategy game, then
x ∈ E(G) ⇐⇒ φ(x) ∈
⋂
i∈N
arg max
y∈φ(Xi,x−i)
max
xi∈φ−1i (y,x−i)
ui(xi, y).
If G is a pairwise-injective, aggregate-strategy game, then
(3.1) x ∈ E(G) ⇐⇒ φ(x) ∈
⋂
i∈N
arg max
y∈φ(Xi,x−i)
ui
(
φ−1i (y,x−i) , y
)
.
12Here, the equivalence relation is defined with respect to the aggregate, φ. That is, x ∼ x′ ⇐⇒
φ(x) = φ(x′).
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Going forward, we will assume that φ is pairwise injective and therefore (3.1) gives
the key result.13 A remarkable consequence of the theorem is that in any equilibrium,
all players must agree on the choice of the aggregate. This principle of aggregate con-
currence provides a powerful perspective for analyzing equilibria in aggregate games.14
3.2. Self-generating maximization programs
The aggregate concurrence principle suggests that a maximization program over Y
might be constructed for which the set of maximizers corresponds with EY (G).15 If so,
such a program would allow conclusions about equilibria to be drawn directly from
the maximization program rather than the more complex strategic game. With few
exceptions, unfortunately, such a maximization program would also be self-referential,
requiring a fixed-point to be satisfied as part of the solution.
To fix ideas, consider first the general case of normal-form games. The definition
of equilibrium can be stated equivalently as a self-generating maximization (SGM)
program: For any vector of positive weights λ = (λ1, . . . , λn), x is an equilibrium iff
x ∈ arg max
x∈X
∑
i∈N
λiui(xi,x−i).
Denoting the right-hand side more succinctly as Λ(x,x,λ), we have the statement
that for any λ ∈ Rn++,
x ∈ E(G) ⇐⇒ x ∈ arg max
x∈X
Λ(x,x,λ).
In the case of general normal-form games, the solution to this SGM program is of the
same order of complexity as finding the fixed points to the n-player game. Nothing
is gained by reformulating the problem in this manner.
In the case of aggregative normal-form games, however, if one is only interested in
the equilibrium aggregates, EY (G), then an aggregate SGM program may reduce the
complexity of the problem considerably. In particular, we may be able to project the
SGM program defined over X onto the smaller aggregate space Y . Ideally, we seek
conditions for which
(3.2) y ∈ EY (G) ⇐⇒ y ∈ arg max
y∈Y
Λ(y, y,λ).
As a starting point, given that φ is pairwise-injective, at an equilibrium point x ∈
E(G) we may define the collective surplus of the players by the welfare function
W (y,x,λ) ≡
∑
i∈N
λiui(φ
−1
i (y,x−i), y).
13For applications in which pairwise injectivity is not an appropriate assumption, our results can
be reinterpreted as holding on the aggregate-quotient space of the game.
14While others have used this idea indirectly, to our knowledge Bernheim and Whinston (1986a)
are the first to recognize explicitly the force of this principle in their study of moral hazard in
a common agency game with finite-dimensional strategies: “We underscore the need to make the
principals’ objectives congruent in equilibrium: since all principals can effect the same changes in
the aggregate incentive scheme, none must find any such change worthwhile.” (Ibid., p.929.)
15There is a related literature on best-response equivalences between normal-form games and
identical-interest (a.k.a. best-response potential) games. Voorneveld (2000) and Morris and Ui
(2004) have proven several interesting results in this direction. We address the relationship between
this literature and the aggregate game results in the present paper in the final section of this paper.
8 D. MARTIMORT, L. STOLE
Theorem 1 states that an equilibrium aggregate, y = φ(x), must maximize W over a
suitably restricted feasible set of aggregates for any non-negative vector λ ∈ ∆ . We
have the immediate corollary to Theorem 1.
Corollary 1 If G is a pairwise-injective aggregate game, then
(3.3) x ∈ E(G) ⇐⇒ ∀λ ∈ ∆, φ(x) ∈
⋂
i∈N :
λi>0
arg max
y ∈φ(Xi,x−i)
W (y,x,λ).
Stated in this way, the aggregate concurrence principle is an invariance property:
The subset of optimal aggregates that are invariant to the welfare weights is exactly
the set of equilibrium aggregates. The value of Corollary 1 is most clear if we place
additional structure on φ and W .
Definition 1 We say that the game G is aggregate-invariant if there exists a
vector of welfare weights, λ ∈ ∆, such that
arg max
y∈Y0
W (y,x,λ) = arg max
y∈Y0
W (y,x′,λ)
for any Y0 ⊆ Y and any x, x′ such that φ(x) = φ(x′).
The immediate implication of aggregate invariance is that we may take any such λ
and define the function
Λ(y, φ(x),λ) = W (y,x,λ)
with the property that for any xˆ in the aggregate equivalence class [yˆ] = {x ∈
X | φ(x) = yˆ}, we have
arg max
y∈Y0
Λ(y, yˆ,λ) ≡ arg max
y∈Y0
W (y, xˆ,λ).
Using such a construction, we can deduce a particularly useful corollary from Theorem
1 which gives necessary conditions in form of (3.2).
Corollary 2 If G is an aggregate-invariant game for weight vector λ, then
(3.4) x ∈ E(G) =⇒ φ(x) ∈
⋂
i∈N
arg max
y ∈φ(Xi,x−i)
Λ(y, φ(x),λ).
If in addition φ is pairwise-bijective, then
(3.5) y ∈ EY (G) =⇒ y ∈ arg max
y∈Y
Λ(y, y,λ).
The import of the corollary is that if we know an equilibrium exists and the game
is aggregate invariant, then it suffices to restrict attention to the set of self-generating
maximizers of Λ. If G is aggregate invariant for multiple welfare weights, then for
each such λ we can construct a corresponding Λ objective. An equilibrium aggre-
gate must be a solution to all such SGM programs. If the solution set to any SGM
AGGREGATE GAMES 9
program has a unique element, then it represents the unique Nash equilibrium out-
come. If the set contains multiple equilibrium candidates, then we may consider other
aggregate-invariant welfare weights, and restrict attention to the intersection of the
SGM solution sets.
Example 2 - Beauty contests, continued: Consider again player i’s payoff func-
tion,
ui(xi, y) = −
∫
Θ×Σ
(
(1− αi) (xi(si)− θ0)2 + αi (xi(si)− y(s))2
)
dG(θ0, s).
Substituting xi 7→ n(y − y) + xi, expanding the quadratic terms, and eliminating all
terms which are independent of both xi and y, we obtain a simpler, equally faithful,
representation of player i’s preferences over y given i′’s rivals are playing x−i:
ui (n(y − y) + xi, y) =∫
Θ×Σ
{
−ψi
2
y(s)2 + y(s)(n− αi)(ny(s)− xi(si))− y(s)n(1− αi)θ
}
dG(θ0, s).
Above we have introduced the notation ψi = (n− αi)2 + αi(1− αi). Given the upper
bound on αi, it follows that ψi > 0 and that n > αi. Using the weight of λi =
1
n(n−αi)
for each player i, we can aggregate the players’ payoffs to obtain an aggregate-invariant
representation:
Λ(y, y,λ) = −
∫
Θ×Σ
{
1
2
y(s)2
(
1
n
∑
i∈N
ψi
n− αi
)
− y(s)y(s)(n− 1)
−y(s)nθ
(
1
n
∑
i∈N
1− αi
n− αi
)}
dG(θ0, s).
Define the scalar
κ ≡
∑
i∈N
1− αi
n− αi ,
and note that κ > 1− n. Using the expression for ψi, it can be established that
1
n
∑
i∈N
ψi
n− αi − (n− 1) =
∑
i∈N
1− αi
n− αi = κ.
This algebraic fact allows us to simplify the aggregate objective:
Λ(y, y,λ) = −
∫
Θ×Σ
{
1
2
y(s)2 (κ+ (n−1))− y(s) (y(s)(n−1) + κ θ0)
}
dG(θ0, s).
The integrand in the definition of Λ is continuously differentiable and strictly concave
in y(s) pointwise, and so the solution set to the SGM program in Corollary 2 may be
computed by optimizing pointwise with respect to y(s) over the set of feasible aggre-
gates and imposing y(s) = y(s) on the solution for each s ∈ Σ. Because Θ is convex,
the local first-order condition therefore a necessary condition for any equilibrium ag-
gregate. Remarkably, aggregate concurrence implies that for any generic preference
vector (i.e., κ 6= 0), for any arbitrary information structure (G,Θ×Σ), and for every
equilibrium, the aggregate estimate y(s) is an unbiased estimate of θ0.
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Proposition 1 For any beauty-contest game with κ 6= 0, every equilibrium aggre-
gate, y, is an unbiased estimate of θ0:
(3.6)
∫
Θ×Σ
(y(s)− θ0)dG(θ0, s) = 0.
For any beauty-contest game with κ = 0, there is an equilibrium in which the aggregate
is unbiased if the conditional expectation E[(θ0, s−i) | si] is linear in si for each i ∈ N .
The genericity requirement, κ 6= 0, rules out pathological cases such as when αi = 1
for all i ∈ N . In this particular case, there is an uncountable number of biased equi-
librium outcomes and any aggregate report can arise in equilibrium. Less obvious
pathologies are also ruled out. Consider a two player game with preferences given by
α1 =
7
6
, α2 =
3
4
and assume that the players’ signals are independent, conditional on
θ0. For every θˆ ∈ Θ, there exists a corresponding equilibrium in which E[y(s)] = θˆ.16
For θˆ = E[θ0], the aggregate is unbiased; otherwise, there are a uncountable number of
biased equilibria. By using an aggregate-game framework to characterize the equilib-
ria, the key genericity condition, κ 6= 0, is immediate. If this genericity condition fails,
an unbiased equilibrium aggregate still exists if conditional expectations are linear in
signals (e.g., a Gaussian information structure), but unbiasedness is no longer assured
for all equilibria. Technically, there is a failure of aggregate lower-hemicontinuity over
the parameter space at κ = 0.
While this simple “unbiasedness” result does not tell us about the social value of
information, it applies to a much larger class of beauty-contest games than has been
studied in such papers as Morris and Shin (2002), Angeletos and Pavan (2007) and
Myatt and Wallace (2008). Notice that the number of players is finite, so every
player’s action has a measurable impact on the aggregate. The players may also
have very different preferences about the desirability of being close to the aggregate
y(s). The information structure in the present analysis is not necessarily Gaussian,
nor is it necessarily symmetric across players. Finally, there is no requirement that
the players’ signals are independent conditional on θ0. This generality makes our
unbiased-aggregate result more surprising.
Suppose, for example, that signals are not independent, conditional on θ0. In par-
ticular, consider a two-player game and suppose that player 1’s signal is s1 = θ0 + ε1,
but that player 2’s signal is s2 = ε1. Hence, player 2 knows nothing about θ0 that
is not contained in the public prior, but player 2 knows the exact bias in player 1’s
signal. In equilibrium, x1(s1) cannot be everywhere constant, and so if α2 6= 0, player
2’s action will depend upon s2 = ε1 with the result that x2 will be a biased estimate of
θ0. The unbiased-aggregate result, however, implies that on average such individual
biases cancel each other out.17
Finally, we emphasize again that aggregate unbiasedness also holds even if αi < 0
for some players. With such preferences, players prefer to make accurate predictions
16The equilibrium strategies are given by x1(s1) =
7
3E[θ0]− 43E[θ0 | s1]+ 75 θˆ and x2(s2) = E[θ0]+ 35 θˆ.
17If the prior distribution of θ0 is normal with mean µ and variance σ
2, and if player 1’s signal
noise is normally distributed with mean zero and variance τ2, then the linear equilibrium of this
game is x1(s1) = a1s1 + b1 and
x2(s2) =
2(1− α)
(2− α) µ+
α
(2− α) (a1(µ+ s2) + b1),
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(i.e., 1− α > 0), but also prefer to distinguish themselves from the mob.18 Remark-
ably, equilibrium unbiasedness is also necessary for games in which players prefer to
be dissimilar. 
Comparative statics. The SGM programs in (3.4) and (3.5) suggest that one may
be able to directly compute various marginal properties about equilibrium aggregates
when Λ is differentiable. For example, when φ is pairwise bijective and Λ is smooth, we
can differentiate the expression in (3.5), and apply the Envelope Theorem to conclude
that any equilibrium aggregate y must satisfy
(3.7) Λy(y, y,λ) = 0.
If the game G is parameterized by ρ, we can incorporate ρ into an SGM program
directly and redefine the objective as a function of ρ: Λ(y, y,λ; ρ). The comparative
statics on any aggregate equilibrium selection, y(ρ), can be obtained using standard
comparative static analysis. For example, under assumptions of differentiability, an
immediate comparative static is
sign {y′(ρ)} = sign {Λyρ(y(ρ), y(ρ),λ; ρ)} .
Differentiability is not necessary, of course. It is sufficient that Λ(y, y,λ; ρ) exhibits
either increasing or decreasing differences in (y, ρ).
Equivalence with zero-sum games. The self-generating program in (3.5) can be
recast as finding the minmax value of a fictitious two-person, zero-sum game. Suppose
that G is aggregate-invariant and φ is pairwise-bijective. Let player A have the payoff
Φ(ya, yb) ≡ Λ(ya, yb,λ)−Λ(yb, yb,λ) and player B the negative of Φ. By construction,
it follows that
min
yb∈Y
max
ya∈Y
Φ(ya, yb) ≥ 0 ≥ max
ya∈Y
min
yb∈Y
Φ(ya, yb).
The minmax solution (if one exists19) corresponds to values of ya and yb such that
Φ(y, y) = 0 and Λ(y, y,λ) = maxy∈Y Λ(y, y,λ). In this sense, when an equilibrium
exists, finding the equilibrium aggregates to an n-player aggregate game over X is
equivalent to solving a two-person zero-sum game over the smaller aggregate space,
Y .
The preceding results for SGM programs offer useful tools for characterizing equilib-
ria, but require that G be aggregate-invariant. We now look for primitive assumptions
on G which guarantee aggregate-invariance and therefore afford us the simpler SGM
program. Linearity will be the crucial ingredient.
where
a1 =
2(1− α)(2− α)σ2
4(1− α)τ2 + (2− α)2σ2 , b1 = µ
(
4(1− α)τ2 + (2− α)ασ2
4(1− α)τ2 + (2− α)2σ2
)
.
We have E(s1,s2,θ0)[
1
2 (x1(s1) + x2(s2))− θ0] = 0 as implied by Proposition 1.
18For example, as in Prendergast and Stole (1996), the player prefers to signal his information is
of higher quality by taking more extreme positions.
19If Φ(ya, yb) is quasi-concave in ya and quasi-convex in yb, then we are guaranteed such a solution
exists. Sion (1958).
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4. LINEAR AGGREGATE GAMES
4.1. Definitions
The main representation result in Theorem 1 is based on an abstract notion of ag-
gregation, with little additional algebraic or topological structure on the game. The
more powerful characterizations which emerge from a self-generating maximization
program, however, required that the game has an aggregate-invariant welfare func-
tion. Understanding this last assumption, in particular, requires that we place more
structure on the aggregate game, G. We proceed in this direction by first defining a
large class of aggregate games with a linear payoff structure that includes our various
working examples. We then introduce symmetry restrictions that guarantee aggregate
invariance.
In what follows, it is helpful to introduce the notion of a bilinear form. A bilinear
form is a mapping defined on two (possibly distinct) linear spaces which is a linear
function of each argument. We use 〈·, ·〉 : V × W → R to denote such a mapping,
with the defining property that for every f ∈ V , 〈f, ·〉 is a linear functional onW and
for every g ∈ W , 〈·, g〉 is a linear functional on V . The notation we use is evocative of
an inner product, which is an example of a bilinear form that is also symmetric and
positive definite. In the simplest such case, V =W = R and the bilinear form reduces
to scalar multiplication. A bilinear form, however, is more general than an inner
product as it allows asymmetries and semi-definiteness. 20 In Section 5, for example,
we define a large class of distributional games by specializing the bilinear form to the
Lebesgue-Stieltjes integral of a function, f ∈ V , with respect to the measure derived
from the distribution g ∈ W , and thus 〈f, g〉 ≡ ∫ fdg. In this case, V denotes the
space of bounded Borel-measurable functions and W is a space of Radon measures.
Presently, we use the bilinear form in a general sense to define payoffs in the class
of linear aggregate games.
Definition 2 An aggregate game G is a linear aggregate game if
1. X1, . . . , Xn are subsets of a real linear space, (V ,+, ·);
2. φ : X → Y is a linear operator which can be written (up to a normalization)
as21
φ(x) =
∑
i∈N
xi
where Y = X1 + · · ·+Xn, and “+” is denotes set addition.22
3. preferences for player i ∈ N are representable by, ui : Xi × Y → R,
ui(xi, y) ≡ αi(y) + 〈xi, βi(y)〉,
where αi : Y → R is a real function, βi : Y →W is a mapping to the real linear
space W, and 〈·, ·〉 : V ×W → R is a bilinear form.
20As an example of semi-definiteness, 〈f, g〉 = 〈f ′, g〉 for g 6= 0W need not imply that f = f ′.
21A linear operator has the form φ(x) =
∑
i∈N xizi. We can transform xi 7→ xizi and adjust the
payoff functions to obtain our simpler form. More generally, with some effort at defining an algebraic
group and the operation or “addition”, we can extend the class of aggregate games to include more
general operators (e.g., aggregates that are products of strategies, etc.) by considering isomorphic
strategy spaces and corresponding payoff functions.
22If A, B are sets, b ∈ B, then A+ {b} = {a+ b | a ∈ A} and A+B = {a+ b | a ∈ A, b ∈ B}.
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The first requirement guarantees that scalar multiplication and addition are well
defined on the strategy and aggregate spaces and that strategy spaces can be positively
scaled.
The second assumption restricts attention to additive operators, which are naturally
pairwise-injective. Recall that although φ is additive, it is not necessarily pairwise-
bijective (e.g., aggregate output in a Cournot game illustrates this relationship). If,
however, each Xi is closed under addition and subtraction, then φ is pairwise bi-
jective. In what follows, the set of equilibrium aggregates for games in which φ is
pairwise bijective (rather than simply pairwise-injective) are significantly simpler to
characterize.
The third assumption is the most restrictive as it requires that ui(xi, y) − ui(0, y)
is linear in xi. While the payoff linearity restriction still allows for nonlinearities in y
(and indirectly in xi through φ), the restriction does rule out more general aggregate
games. For example, Cournot games with non-constant marginal costs would give rise
to payoff functions that are not affine in a player’s own strategy (holding the aggregate
constant). Fortunately, many aggregate games do satisfy this linearity requirement,
including three of our working examples.
To this linear structure, it will be productive to add various notions of payoff sym-
metry on the bilinear representation
ui(xi, y) = αi(y) + 〈xi, βi(y)〉.
Definition 3 G is a weakly symmetric linear aggregate game if it is a linear
aggregate game and for each player i ∈ N
βi(y) = β(y) + δi,
where β : X → V and δi ∈ V.
G is strongly symmetric if, in addition, payoffs satisfy
βi(y) = β(y)
αi(y) = α(y) + 〈γi, β(y)〉,
where α : X → R and γi ∈ V, and the strategy spaces are symmetric,
X1 = · · · = Xn = Y = X ⊆ V .
The import of weak symmetry implies the difference in payoff to player i between
xi = x and xi = x
′ minus the difference in payoff to player j between the same x and
x′ is linear in x− x′ and independent of y:
(ui(x, y)− ui(x′, y))− (uj(x, y)− uj(x′, y)) = 〈x− x′, δi − δj〉.
With the additional requirement of strong symmetry this difference is zero. Moreover,
the difference in payoff to player i between y and y′ minus the difference in payoff to
player j between the same y and y′ is linear in β(y)− β(y′) and independent of x:
(ui(x, y)− ui(x, y′))− (uj(x, y)− uj(x, y′)) = 〈γi − γj, β(y)− β(y′)〉.
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Strong symmetry has a further requirement that the players’ strategy spaces are
identical. Note that in any linear aggregate game, if φ is pairwise bijective, then there
is a linear bijection between any two players’ strategy sets and so, without loss of
generality, we may take the players’ strategy spaces to be equal.
Supply-function games (with symmetric marginal costs) and intrinsic common agency
games are both strongly-symmetric, linear aggregate games. This is not true for our
other examples.
Example 1 - Cournot games, continued: The class of weakly-symmetric, linear
aggregate games contains many interesting applications, including the Cournot game
with payoffs
pii(q,Q) = qi(P (Q)− ci)− Fi.
The assumption of strong symmetry is more restrictive, further requiring that marginal
costs are symmetric across firms, ci = cj. Strategy spaces are equal across players,
but the aggregate is not pairwise bijective. 
Example 2 - Beauty contests, continued: The Beauty contest game is, strictly
speaking, not a linear aggregate game because it is quadratic in xi. That said, after
making the substitution from xi to n(y − y) + xi and simplifying, the resulting pref-
erences are linear in xi, and therefore we are able to establish aggregate invariance.
In this sense, the transformed Beauty-contest game is a linear aggregate game. Note,
however, that while the preferences of the players satisfy the conditions of strong sym-
metry, the strategy spaces of the players are not themselves symmetric. For example,
player 1’s strategy set is the set of mappings from player 1’s signal set to reports;
this is distinct from principal 2’s strategy space. The consequence is that the aggre-
gate space is richer than any individual player’s strategy space – the aggregate is an
additively-separable mapping from all signal spaces. Hence, beauty contests are only
weakly symmetric. 
4.2. Necessary conditions for EY (G)
We restrict attention to weakly-symmetric, linear aggregate games and ask what
are the characteristics of any equilibrium aggregate. To this end, the following lemma
which establishes aggregate-invariance for the class of linear games is invaluable.
Lemma 2 (Aggregate-invariance) Suppose that G is a weakly-symmetric, linear
aggregate game. For any M ⊆ N and any Y0 ⊆ X1 + · · ·+Xn,
arg max
y∈Y0
1
|M |
∑
i∈M
ui(y − y + xi, y) = arg max
y∈Y0
ΛM(y, yM , y),
where
ΛM(y, yM , y) ≡ 〈β(y) + δM , y − y + yM/|M |〉+ αM(y),
and yM =
∑
i∈M xi, δM =
1
|M |
∑
i∈M δi, and αM(y) =
1
|M |
∑
i∈M αi(y).
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Given that we are using uniform welfare weights, we have suppressed the argument
λ from Λ in the Lemma above. We follow this convention for the remainder of this
paper.
Setting M = N , an immediate implication of the lemma is that G is aggregate-
invariant for uniform welfare weights. That is, for any Y0 ⊆ X1 + · · ·+Xn, we have
arg max
y∈Y0
1
n
∑
i∈N
ui(y − y + xi, y) = arg max
y∈Y0
Λ(y, y),
where Λ(y, y) ≡ ΛN(y, yN , y).
Consider more generally the subset of aggregates that any player in a given set
M ⊆ N can implement, ⋂i∈M φ(Xi,x−i). If G is a linear aggregate game, then
φ(Xi,x−i) = Xi + {y − xi}. It follows that⋂
i∈M
φ(Xi,x−i) =
⋂
i∈M
Xi + {y − xi}.
If φ is pairwise-bijective (and therefore the players’ strategy spaces and the aggregate
space can be represented as X = X1 = · · · = Xn = Y ), we have for any M ⊆ N the
more powerful relationship ⋂
i∈M
φ(Xi,x−i) = X.
With these insights, we combine the construction of ΛN(y, yN , y) from Lemma 2)
with Corollary 2 to obtain our main necessity theorem.
Theorem 2 Suppose that G is a weakly-symmetric, linear aggregate game. Then
for every M ⊆ N ,
(4.1) x ∈ E(G) =⇒ φ(x) ∈
⋂
i∈M
arg max
y∈Xi+{y−xi}
ΛM(y,
∑
i∈M
xi, φ(x))
⊆ arg max
∩i∈MXi+{y−xi}
ΛM(y,
∑
i∈M
xi, φ(x)),
and consequently
(4.2) x ∈ E(G) =⇒ φ(x) ∈ arg max
∩i∈NXi+{y−xi}
Λ(y, φ(x)).
If φ is pairwise-bijective, then
(4.3) y ∈ EY (G) =⇒ y ∈ arg max
y∈X
Λ(y, y).
The sets of solutions to the various SGM programs above are often quite tractable
to calculate as we will see when applied to our examples. As an immediate illustra-
tion, we apply Theorem 2 to the Cournot game.
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Example 1 - Cournot games, continued: As argued above, the Cournot output
game with constant unit costs of production is a linear aggregate game with weakly-
symmetric payoffs. As a thought experiment, suppose that Cournot aggregation is
pairwise-bijective. Then the application of (4.3) implies
Q ∈ arg max
Q≥0
1
n
(P (Q)− cN)(nQ− (n− 1)Q)
where cN =
1
n
∑
i ci is the average unit cost in the industry. This SGM program can
be restated as
(4.4) Q ∈ arg max
Q≥0
Q(P (Q)− cN) + (n− 1)(Q−Q)(P (Q)− cN).
where the first term represents industry profit and the second term captures the
strategic effects on output. Without any conditions on demand, we could conclude
that in any equilibrium with n > 1 active firms, there will be over-production relative
to the monopoly level. This follows because the second term is increasing in Q around
any equilibrium point Q = Q. Furthermore, providing that P (Q) is concave (or at
least not too convex), there exists a unique solution to the SGM program in (4.4).
Of course, using (4.3) is predicated on the false assumption that aggregation is
pairwise-bijective. The appropriate SGM program to consider is in fact (4.1):
Q ∈ arg max
Q≥maxi∈M
∑
j 6=i qj
Q(P (Q)− cM) + (m− 1)(Q−Q)(P (Q)− cM)
+ (P (Q) − cM)(QM − Q).
If it is known that M contains exactly those firms that produce positive output in
equilibrium, then Q = QM and the inequality constraint on Q in the above argmax
program is slack. Providing that the objective is quasi-concave, we can replace the
slack constraint with the weaker constraint Q ≥ 0 without changing the solution to
the program.
(4.5) Q ∈ arg max
Q≥0
Q(P (Q)− cM) + (m− 1)(Q−Q)(P (Q)− cM).
Conditional on the equilibrium set of active firms, M , the SGM program in (4.5)
implies that output is greater than that which maximizes the collective profits of the
producing firms.
One can also readily see from the statement in (4.5) that a mean-preserving change
in the distribution of industry unit costs that leaves the set of active firms unchanged
can have no effect on the market price. This result is similar to the well-known neu-
trality of differential taxation in public finance. Of course, the neutrality result is as
fragile as the condition that the set of active firms is invariant, a fact well known in the
existing applied-theory literatures. Bergstrom, Blume and Varian (1985) first noted
such an invariance in the context of public goods games; Levin (1984) and Bergstrom
and Varian (1985a, 1985b) note a similar invariance for Cournot games. 
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4.3. Sufficient conditions
The result in Theorem 2 states that membership in the solution set of a particular
SGM program is a necessary condition for an equilibrium aggregate. While useful, this
does not tell us which solutions to the SGM program (if any) represent equilibrium
aggregates. If payoff functions are strongly symmetric, however, we can conclude that
any aggregate in the solution to some SGM program is an equilibrium outcome.
Consider the strategy profile x uniquely defined by the following n+ 1 linear equa-
tions:
xi =
1
n
y − (γi − γN), i ∈ N,
y =
∑
j∈N
xj.
Specializing Theorem 1 to the case of strongly-symmetric, linear aggregate games,
this x is an equilibrium if
y ∈
⋂
i∈N
arg max
y∈X+{y−xi}
Λ(y, y),
where
Λ(y, y) ≡ α(y) + 〈y − y(n− 1)/n+ γN , β(y)〉.
The following sufficiency result is an immediate consequence.
Theorem 3 If G is a strongly-symmetric linear aggregate game, then
(4.6)
y
∣∣∣∣∣∣ y ∈
⋂
i∈N
arg max
y∈X+{ (n−1)n y+γi−γN}
Λ(y, y)
 ⊆ EY (G).
If φ is pairwise bijective, then
(4.7)
{
y
∣∣∣∣ y ∈ arg max
y∈X
Λ(y, y)
}
⊆ EY (G).
Combining Theorems 2 and 3 together we summarize our main results for the case
of strongly-symmetric games in a single Proposition.
Proposition 2 If G is a strongly-symmetric linear aggregate game, then
(4.8)
{
y
∣∣∣∣∣ y ∈ ⋂
i∈N
arg max
y∈X+{(n−1)y/n+γi−γN}
Λ(y, y)
}
⊆
EY (G) ⊆
{
φ(x)
∣∣∣∣∣x ∈ X, φ(x) ∈ ⋂
i∈M
arg max
y∈X+{y−xi}
Λ(y, φ(x))
}
.
Consequently, if the aggregate is pairwise-bijective, then
(4.9)
{
y
∣∣∣∣ y ∈ arg max
y∈X
Λ(y, y)
}
= EY (G).
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For pairwise-bijective, strongly-symmetric, linear aggregate games, (4.9) provides a
complete characterization of the equilibrium aggregates via an SGM program. Because
supply-function games and many intrinsic common agency games are members of this
class, we can say quite a bit about equilibrium aggregates by constructing the invariant
welfare function, Λ.
We conclude this section once again emphasizing that the characterization in Propo-
sition 2 is fundamentally an algebraic result – no topological assumptions were used in
the proofs. The aggregate concurrence principle and the necessary and sufficient char-
acterizations derived from this central result follow from linear (rather than metric)
properties.23
5. DISTRIBUTIONAL AGGREGATE GAMES
The applications which motivated this paper are symmetric, linear-aggregate games
with infinite-dimensional strategy spaces in which the aggregate enters payoff func-
tions through a probability distribution, which we refer to as the class of distributional
aggregate games for short.
We are interested in characterizing the set of equilibrium aggregates for games
in which players choose strategies from subset of real bounded, Borel-measurable
functions, Xi ⊆ Bb(Ω) defined on some Ω, and for which the aggregate function,
y =
∑
i xi, determines a probability distribution on Ω given by H(· | y) : Ω→ [0, 1].24
Hence, we are requiring that H is non-decreasing, has bounded variation, and is
right-continuous.
Preferences for player i are represented by
ui(xi, y) = αi(y) +
∫
Ω
(xi(ω) + γi(ω))dH(ω | y).
Because H is a probability distribution, this integral is well-defined over the set of
Borel-measurable, bounded functions.25 Notice that H may be discontinuous; indeed
such discontinuities may arise naturally in equilibrium.26 By choosing 〈f, g〉 7→ ∫ fdg
as the bilinear form, distributional payoff functions are evidently a special case of
linear aggregate game payoffs, ui(xi, y) = αi(y)+ 〈xi+γi, H(y)〉. These distributional
payoffs are weakly symmetric; they are strongly symmetric if αi is independent of i
and X1 = · · · = Xn. Thus our previous results for linear aggregate games are imme-
diately available.
Definition 4 The game G is a distributional aggregate game if
• G is a linear, weakly symmetric aggregate game with strategy spaces Xi ⊆
Bb(Ω), where Bb(Ω) is the set of real, bounded Borel-measurable functions with
domain Ω;
23Of course, establishing that E(G) is non-empty or that the solution set to the SGM program is
non empty, will typically require additional topological assumptions.
24We should emphasize at this stage that we allow for discontinuities in such probability distribu-
tion functions, but that we restrict attention to probability distributions rather than the larger class
of generalized distribution functions associated with Sobolev and Schwartz.
25See, for example, Aliprantis and Border (2006, Theorem 11.8).
26To anticipate results which follow, in the case of common agency H has an upward jump discon-
tinuity at any q ∈ Q which is chosen by a positive measure of agents (i.e., at all points of bunching).
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• preferences are representable by
(5.1) ui(xi, y) = αi(y) +
∫
Ω
(xi(ω) + γi(ω))dH(ω | y),
where αi : X → R, γi ∈ Bb(Ω).
• G is a strongly-symmetric distributional aggregate game if
α1 = · · · = αn = α,
X1 = · · · = Xn = X.
The main import of distributional aggregate games is the influence of the aggregate
through its effect on the distribution H(ω | y) in (5.1). Both the supply function
game (with symmetric unit costs) and the common agency game are examples of
strongly-symmetric distributional aggregate games.
It is useful to specialize our characterizations in Theorems 2 and 3 for the case of
distributional aggregate games. To this end, redefine the aggregate-invariant welfare
function for the class of distributional aggregate games as
(5.2) Λ(y, y) = α(y) +
∫
Ω
(
y(ω)−
(
n− 1
n
)
y(ω) + γN(ω)
)
dH(ω | y),
where we recall that γN =
1
n
∑
i γi. Because our distributional game is linear and
symmetric (by definition), we may use the above construction of Λ and directly apply
the various results for linear aggregate games.
5.1. Supply function games
Consider supply-function games. Let Ω = [0, b] ⊂ R+ represent a bounded set
of nonnegative prices and R the space of supplied output (recall negative supply is
interpreted as demand). We assume that b is sufficiently large that at price p =
pˆ, demand is zero regardless of θ. The strategy space is X = Bb([0, pˆ],R). For
the moment, take the market maker’s price-setting function as an exogenously given
measurable function mapping from the demand state, θ ∈ Θ, and the sum of the
firms’ supply functions, S =
∑
i∈N Si, to a market price, p0 : Θ×X → [0, pˆ]. For any
aggregate-supply function, S, the distribution of demand states induces a well-defined
probability distribution over prices:
H(p |S) = Prob (θ ∈ Θ | p0(θ, S) ≤ p) .
We assume that each firm’s cost of production is constant and equal to c, which
implies that a firm’s expected profit function takes the form in (5.1):∫
[0,b]
Si(p)(p− c)dH(p|S).
Because S =
∑
i Si is pairwise-bijective, we can immediately apply Proposition 2
to obtain a necessary and sufficient condition for any equilibrium aggregate supply
function, S:
(5.3) S ∈ arg max
S∈Bb([0,pˆ])
∫
[0,b]
(
S(p)(p− c) + (n−1)(S(p)− S(p))(p− c)) dH(p |S).
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Stated as an SGM program, we have a simple decomposition into two economic influ-
ences. The first term in the objective is industry profit. The second term characterizes
the non-cooperative effect: for n = 1 it is absent, and as n grows its weight relative
to industry profit increases. Except for the assumption of symmetric marginal costs,
we have placed very little structure on the primitives of the game but may nonethe-
less conclude that every equilibrium supply function, S, must be a solution to the
the (self-generated) program in (5.3). In particular, we have said nothing about the
character of p0 (which is embedded in H), the relationship between θ and market
demand, or the distribution of demand states.
With additional structure, we can say more about the non-cooperative effect. Sup-
pose that the market maker’s objective is to select a market-clearing price. Thus,
p0(θ, S) is a pointwise solution to the equation, D(p, θ) = S(p). If no solution exists,
we assume that the market maker dictates that no trades take place; we denote the
set of no-trade demand states as Θ∅ and its complement by Θ = Θ/Θ∅. If multiple
solutions exist, we assume the market-maker chooses the lowest market-clearing price;
this selection maximizes the volume traded. In addition, we assume that D is strictly
increasing in θ, which implies that p0 is a strictly increasing function on Θ, with the
inverse function denoted θ0(p, S). If F : Θ → [0, 1] is the distribution function over
demand states, then the corresponding distribution of prices is
H(p|S) = F (θ0(p, S)).
Because D(p0(θ), θ) = S(p0(θ)) on Θ by construction, we can translate the previ-
ous self-generating program into an equivalent problem over the dual space of price
functions:
(5.4) p ∈ arg max
p∈Bb(Θ,[0,pˆ])
∫
Θ
D(p(θ), θ)(p(θ)− c)dF (θ)+
(n − 1)
∫
Θ
(D(p(θ), θ) − S(p(θ)))(p(θ) − c)dF (θ).
Again, the first term represents industry profit and the second term contains the
additional strategic effect.
To find the equilibrium points of the supply function game, we need to find each self-
generating fixed point, p (or S, alternatively). We restrict attention to equilibria for
which Θ∅ has measure zero and require that demand functions are (once) differentiable
with Dp strictly increasing in θ. The latter monotonicity requirement insures that for
any S, the pointwise optimizing p of the integrand is strictly increasing in θ. If p is
the optimal price function associated with S, because it is strictly increasing we can
replace S(p) with D(p, p−1(p)) in the integrand. Pointwise maximization yields the
following differential equation for the market price:
(5.5)
dp(θ)
dθ
=
(n− 1)(p(θ)− c)Dθ(p(θ), θ)
(p(θ)− c)Dp(p(θ), θ) +D(p(θ), θ) .
The solution set of this differential equation is exactly the set of market-clearing
equilibria (i.e., equilibria for which the market clears with probability one).
Rather than finding explicit solutions to the differential equation, we investigate
the properties of equilibrium price functions directly from the optimization program.
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Define pb(θ) ≡ c as the Bertrand (perfectly competitive) price function and pc(θ) as
the Cournot price function, which satisfies (pointwise) the equation
Dp(p
c(θ), θ)(pc(θ)− c) + 1
n
D(pc(θ), θ) ≡ 0.
Restricting attention to equilibria with strictly increasing supply functions, we can be
assured that S is differentiable almost everywhere. The pointwise derivative of the
integrand in (5.4) with respect to price in equilibrium is(
nDp(p(θ), θ)− (n− 1)Sp(p(θ))
)
(p(θ)− c) +D(p(θ), θ).
If, in addition, Dθθ ≥ 0, then the integrand is strictly quasi-concave in p, and so the
first-order solution characterizes the optimum. Evaluated at pb(θ) = c, this derivative
is equal to D(c, θ) ≥ 0, indicating that p(θ) ≥ pb(θ). Evaluating the first-order
equation at pc(θ), we instead obtain a derivative of −(n− 1)Sp(pc(θ)) < 0. Thus, in
any equilibrium with increasing aggregate supply, the equilibrium price function must
lie between the Bertrand and Cournot solutions:
pb(θ) ≤ p(θ) < pc(θ).
If we restrict the strategy space of each firm to contain only nondecreasing supply
schedules, then any resulting equilibrium price function would satisfy these bounds.
Absent such a restriction, a priori, we cannot rule out the possibility that aggregate
supply is decreasing in some region, only that it cannot decrease too fast: Sp(p) −
Dp ≥ 0. Wherever a non-increasing equilibrium exists, the upper bound on the price
function must exceed pc(θ) in the decreasing supply regions. Note that the derivative
of (5.4) evaluated at the monopoly price, which we denote pm(θ), is nonnegative,
(n− 1)(Dp−Sp)(pm− c) ≤ 0. We conclude that pm(θ) is an upper bound on p(θ) for
the general case.
For the case in which firms have different (but constant) marginal costs, ci, solving
explicitly for the set of Nash equilibria involves finding all the solutions to a system
of differential equations. Unfortunately, the SGM program approach is not entirely
satisfactory either. Evaluated at Cournot prices, the marginal effect of price simplifies
to
−(n− 1)Sp(pc(θ))(pc(θ)− cN)−
∑
i∈N
Si,p(p
c(θ))(ci − cN),
where cN is the average unit cost. Notice that the new term is the covariance of
ci and Si,p(p
c) across the firms. The aggregate concurrence principle tells us that
any two players must have the same marginal returns with respect to the aggregate
components. It follows that whenever high-cost firms have lower market share than
low-cost firms, then high-cost firms must also exhibit greater supply responses. We
may conclude, therefore, that if high cost firms have weakly smaller markets shares
in equilibrium, then the covariance must be is positive and p(θ) < pc(θ).
5.2. Intrinsic common-agency games
The class of games which motivated this paper are intrinsic common agency games
with public contracts.27 Each principal i has a bounded, continuous benefit function
27A full treatment of the issues involved is outside the scope of this note and is developed in
Martimort and Stole (2009,2010).
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of vi : Q → R which gives the return associated to the agent’s choice of q ∈ Q. We
assume that Q is compact. To motivate the agent, a principal may offer a transfer
schedule, Ti ∈ T , which is an agreement to pay the agent Ti(q) whenever q ∈ Q
is chosen. We take the set of available contracts, T , to be the the set of bounded,
upper-semicontinuous functions on Q. Because upper-semicontinuous functions are
Borel measurable, T ⊆ Bb(Q).
Principal i’s payoff when the agent accepts the principal’s offer and chooses q is
vi(q) − Ti(q). If the agent chooses not to participate, then action q∅ is implemented
by default and principal i earns vi(q∅), which we normalize to 0.
We assume that the agent has private information, θ, distributed on Θ with dis-
tribution F (θ). An agent of type θ has a bounded, continuous benefit function,
u(·, θ) : Q → R, and a net payoff
u(q, θ) +
∑
i∈N
Ti(q),
when accepting all of the contracts and choosing q ∈ Q. We take common agency
to be intrinsic in the game; i.e., the agent must either accept all contract offers (and
become a common agent to all n principals) or choose not to participate. In the latter
case, the agent’s reservation utility is normalized to u(q∅, θ) = 0.28
The agent’s strategy is a function q0(θ, T ) which depends upon type and the aggre-
gate contract offer, T . We are assuming in this application that the agent chooses q
without regard to the various contributions of the principals to T .29 For any aggregate
contract offer, T =
∑
i∈N Ti, the agent’s best-response correspondence is non-empty,
compact-valued and upper semi-continuous. Denote the correspondence by
Q0(θ, T ) ≡ arg max
q∈Q
u(q, θ) + T (q),
and let q0(θ, T ) ∈ Q0(θ, T ) be any measurable selection. Fixing q0, we can define the
distribution function30
H(q |T ) ≡ Prob (θ ∈ Θ | q0(θ, T ) ≤ q) .
Thus, taking q0 as given, we have an n-player distributional aggregate game in which
player i’s payoff is represented by
ui(Ti, T ) =
∫
Q
(vi(q)− Ti(q))dH(q |T ).
If we characterize the set of equilibrium aggregates of this n-player game for every
selection q0 ∈ Q0, we will have characterized the entire set of equilibrium aggregates
in the original n+ 1 player game.
28Note that we have not imposed any restrictions on the agent’s benefit function u other than
continuity and boundedness; in particular, we do not impose single-crossing or monotonicity in type.
Thus, the normalization of u(q∅, θ) = 0 to a type-independent reservation utility is without loss of
generality as it can be embedded in the original benefit function: u˜(q, θ) = u(q, θ)− u(q∅, θ).
29In other words, if two profiles (T1, . . . , Tn) and (T
′
1, . . . , T
′
n) both sum to the same aggregate
T =
∑
Ti =
∑
T ′i , then the agent’s equilibrium responses are assumed to be identical.
30The methodological approach of using a distribution function over output which is a function
of nonlinear tariffs is developed in Wilson (1993). Wilson refers to such distributions as “demand
profiles”.
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There are many equilibria to this game. One trivial equilibrium is for two of the
n principals to set transfers sufficiently negative such that every agent prefers to
choose q∅. Such “non-participation” is an equilibrium, possibly Pareto-dominated by
all other equilibria. There are also more interesting equilibria that do not appear
to suffer from such coordination failures. We wish to characterize the entire set of
equilibria, including possibly equilibria with discontinuous transfer functions.
Because the n-player game is a distributional game, it is also aggregate-invariant
and we can construct a weighted payoff function
(5.6) Λ(T, T ) =
1
n
∫
Q
(∑
i∈N
vi(q)− T (q) + (n− 1)(T (q)− T (q))
)
dH(q |T )
and apply our previous results in Theorems 2 and 3.31
There are two cases to consider, depending upon whether or not the aggregate
is pairwise bijective on T . Consider first the case in which Q is a finite collection
of actions, and thus a contract in T is a finite sequence of real numbers and the
agent’s best-response correspondence Q0(θ, T ) is non-empty. The aggregate function,
T =
∑
i∈N Ti is pairwise-bijective because T is closed under addition and subtraction.
As such, Proposition 1 applies squarely to the case of common agency games and we
can conclude:
Corollary 3 In the common agency game, G, if the action space Q is finite, then
(5.7)
{
T
∣∣∣∣T ∈ arg max
T∈T
Λ(T, T )
}
= EY (G).
The second case arises when Q is infinite. Specifically, suppose that Q is a compact
subset of Rk, endowed with the usual topology. Because the difference between two
upper semicontinuous functions is not necessarily upper semi-continuous within this
larger space, the aggregate function is not pairwise bijective (i.e., T is not closed
under subtraction).32 That said, we may still apply Theorem 3 to this non-bijective
setting. Specializing the equilibrium construction from linear games to the present
setting, we have
T i =
1
n
T + vi − 1
n
∑
j∈N
vj,
T + {T−i} = T +
{
(n− 1)
n
T +
1
n
∑
j∈N
vj − vi
}
.
Because T ∈ T and the principals’ benefit functions are continuous, it follows that
T i ∈ T and, consequently, T ∈ T + {T−i}. Revealed preference requires
T ∈ arg max
T∈T
Λ(T, T ) =⇒ T ∈ arg max
T∈T +{T−i}
Λ(T, T ).
31Notice that (5.6) is more generally true for any intrinsic common agency contracting game.
When moral hazard is the source of misaligned incentives, one can reinterpret H(q |T ) to be the
equilibrium distribution of outcomes given the agent’s optimal choice of effort when presented with
the incentive contract T . The content of (5.6) is analogous to the result in Lemma 1 of Bernheim
and Whinston (1986a).
32We are grateful to David Rahman for bringing this important detail to our attention and leading
us to a more thorough understanding of our aggregate characterization for infinite-dimensional games.
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From Theorem 3, we conclude that the constructed contracts are in fact equilibrium
strategies.
Corollary 4 For the common agency game, G,{
T
∣∣∣∣T ∈ arg max
T∈T
Λ(T, T )
}
⊆ EY (G).
Unlike the case in which Q is finite, proving the reverse inclusion requires that we
exploit the metric properties in the game. This proof is accomplished by showing that
the difference between any pair of upper-semicontinuous functions, Ti = T −T−i, can
be approximated from below by another upper-semicontinuous function, T εi ↗ Ti,
such that ui(T
ε
i , T
ε
i + T−i)→ ui(Ti, Ti + T−i). In words, the aggregate T is pairwise-
bijective on a dense subset of T for which payoffs are sequentially continuous. From
this technical result, we have our main conclusion for intrinsic, common agency games.
Proposition 3 In the common agency game, G, if the action space Q is a compact
subset of Rk, then {
T |T ∈ arg max
T∈T
Λ(T, T )
}
= EY (G).
Returning to our SGM program, we may define q(θ) ≡ q0(θ, T ) and U(θ) ≡
u(q(θ), θ) + T (q(θ)) and restate the program in its dual form:
(5.8) (q, U) ∈ arg max
(q,U)∈IC
∫
Θ
{(∑
i∈N
vi(q) + u(q, θ)
)
+ (n− 1)(u(q, θ) + T (q))− nU
}
dF (θ),
where IC is the set of all (q, U) pairs that are implementable by some aggregate T ,
and T is the aggregate transfer that implements (q, U). The dual program in (5.8)
characterizes the entire set of Nash equilibrium pairs (q, U) for the common agency
games. Remarkably, the characterization holds regardless of the dimension of Θ or
the presence of single-crossing.
Consider as an example the equilibrium in which the agent rejects all contracts
because two or more principals make undesirable offers. In the above SGM program,
this corresponds to an equilibrium T that is extremely large and negative for all q 6= q∅.
The solution to the self-generating maximization program therefore is to implement
q∅.
Next consider the more economically interesting set of smooth equilibria with full
participation. If they exist, the Envelope Theorem together with (5.8) implies that
the set of all smooth equilibrium outcomes is characterized by
(q, U) ∈ arg max
(q,U)∈IC
∫
Θ
{(∑
i∈N
vi(q) + u(q, θ)
)
− nU
}
dF (θ).
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This simpler program is no longer self-generating. We may conclude that a smooth
equilibrium exists if and only if this maximization program has a solution. Moreover,
the smooth program suggests that it is as if there is a single principal maximizing
collective surplus less the agent’s information rent multiplied by n. It is tantamount to
an n-fold marginalization of rents. A single firm collectively representing the interests
of all principals would solve a similar program with n replaced with 1. Unsurprisingly,
competition among the principals (weakly) reduces their payoffs relative to what they
would obtain if they could maximize payoffs collectively. More surprising, however,
the program implies that expected consumer surplus is also lower under competition
relative to the collective outcome.
Proposition 4 In any intrinsic common-agency game, every smooth equilibrium
is less socially efficient and exhibits lower agent payoffs in expectation relative to the
outcome in which the principals collude in contract design.
This conclusion is derived entirely from the assumption that the program has a
solution and the nature of the objective function without any need to calculate the
solution explicitly. When Θ is multi-dimensional or single-crossing fails, this is par-
ticularly valuable as closed-form, analytic solutions are typically elusive.
There are still other equilibria that are not smooth and exhibit agent participation.
For these equilibria, nonsmooth analysis must be used to characterize the solutions
to the SGM programs, which we pursue in companion papers, Martimort and Stole
(2010a, 2010b). The approach of aggregate representation, in tandem with these
tools, continues to describe the characteristics of equilibrium aggregates.
As a final extension, one can easily augment this model of intrinsic agency to include
incomplete information for the principals, similar to the analysis in the beauty-contest
game. Sufficiency results are no longer available, but the necessary condition in
Theorem 2 continues to apply. We take up this brief extension in the Appendix.
5.3. Delegated common-agency games: A special case
In both the “Supply Function” and “Intrinsic Common Agency” games, we made
use of the pairwise bijective aggregate to give necessary and sufficient conditions for set
of equilibria aggregates. In many applications of multi-principal contracting, however,
the agent has the ability to select a subset of contract offers. Consider, for example,
the case of lobbyists influencing politicians through contributions. In these delegated
common-agency games, transfers are effectively constrained to be positive as the agent
can reject any disadvantageous offer; the aggregate transfer is not pairwise bijective.
That said, using an SGM program we can establish a set of necessary conditions for
equilibrium aggregates which in many cases will give a satisfactory answer to the
nature of any contractual inefficiencies.
We consider the special case in which q ∈ Q is a one-dimensional choice from a
convex, compact interval Q ⊂ R. In addition, we suppose that each principal has
strictly monotonic preferences for q. For i ∈ A, we assume that v′i(q) > 0; for i ∈ B,
we assume v′i(q) < 0. The agent’s benefit functions is assumed to be continuous and
quasi-bilinear in (q, θ):
u(q, θ) = θq + w(q) + z(θ),
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where w is a strictly concave function of q. Lastly, we assume that θ is distributed on
Θ ≡ [0, 1] with continuous density function f and differentiable distribution function
F . Define the following principal-specific inverse hazard rate:
Hi(θ) ≡

F (θ)−1
f(θ)
, for i ∈ A,
F (θ)
f(θ)
, for i ∈ B.
We make the standard inverse hazard rate assumption that Hi is nondecreasing on
Θ.
Without loss of generality, we can restrict attention to equilibria in which each
principal’s transfer function is nonnegative. For any equilibrium of the delegated
contracting game, {q0, T 1, . . . , T n}, we may define the agent’s outside option from
rejecting principal i’s contract as
U−i(θ) ≡ max
q∈Q
u(q, θ) + T−i(q),
and the agent’s corresponding choice q−i(θ) = q0(θ, T−i) as
q−i(θ) ∈ arg max
q∈Q
u(q, θ) + T−i(q).
In equilibrium, therefore, each principal i chooses a contract offer, Ti ≥ 0, to induce
(q, U) and maximize
(5.9)
∫
Θ
{(
vi(q(θ))− vi(q−i(θ)
)
+
(
u(q(θ), θ) + T−i(q(θ))− U−i(θ)
)
− (U(θ)− U−i(θ))} f(θ)dθ,
subject to the constraint that U(θ) ≥ U−i(θ) for all θ ∈ Θ.
It is helpful at this stage to introduce a mild refinement on the set of equilibria.
We say that an equilibrium is monotone if T i is everywhere nondecreasing for i ∈ A
and everywhere nonincreasing for i ∈ B. Given that a principal i ∈ A prefers greater
levels of q, paying the agent weakly increasing amounts for higher q is a natural feature
to expect in equilibrium.33 Given our restriction to monotone equilibria, principal i’s
program in (5.9) can be greatly simplified. In particular, in any monotone equilibrium,
for any i ∈ A, the set of types for whom U(θ) = U−i(θ) must be a lower (possibly
degenerate) interval, [0, θi]. The reverse is true for principal i ∈ B. Using the standard
result that (q, U) is incentive compatible iff q is nondecreasing and U ′(θ) = q(θ) at all
points for which q is continuous, we can reformulate the program for principal i ∈ A
as
max
q,θi
∫ 1
θi
{
vi(q(θ))− vi(q−i(θ)) + u(q(θ), θ) + T−i(q(θ))
+Hi(θ)(q(θ)− q−i(θ))
}
f(θ)dθ,
33Indeed, we are not even certain that this monotonicity requirement is a refinement per se, as we
have been unable to find any non-monotone equilibria.
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subject to q nondecreasing. Given that Hi is nondecreasing, this program has a
convenient pointwise solution. Define
J i(q, θ) = vi(q) + u(q, θ) + T−i(q) +Hi(θ).
One may then write the pointwise optimal choice for principal i ∈ A as
q(θ) ∈ arg max
q∈Q
max
{
J i(q, θ)− J i(q−i(θ), θ), 0
}
.
Notice that a similar statement holds for principal i ∈ B.
q(θ) ∈ arg max
q∈Q
min
{
J i(q, θ)− J i(q−i(θ), θ), 0
}
.
Now we use the aggregate concurrence principle. Summing the pointwise objec-
tives, we conclude that in any monotone equilibrium, the allocation q must solve the
following SGM program:
q(θ) ∈ arg max
q∈Q
∑
i∈A
max
{
J i(q, θ)− J i(q−i(θ), θ), 0
}
+
∑
i∈B
min
{
J i(q, θ)− J i(q−i(θ), θ), 0
}
.
As a final simplification, assume that each principal’s preference for q is a linear
function, vi(q) = siq. Given linearity, the SGM program may be further reduced to
q(θ) ∈ arg max
q∈Q
∑
i∈A
max
{
si − 1− F (θ)
f(θ)
, 0
}
q +
∑
i∈B
min
{
si +
F (θ)
f(θ)
, 0
}
q
+ u(q, θ) + (n − 1) (u(q, θ) + T (q)) .
This formulation is evocative of Myerson’s (1980) optimal auction design. Indeed, in
the case of smooth transfer equilibria, we can use the Envelope Theorem to eliminate
the final terms. We have the following proposition.
Proposition 5 In the delegated common-agency game with linear principal prefer-
ences, all monotone, smooth equilibria have allocations satisfying
q(θ) ∈ arg max
q∈Q
(∑
i∈A
max
{
si− 1−F (θ)
f(θ)
, 0
}
+
∑
i∈B
min
{
si+
F (θ)
f(θ)
, 0
})
q
+ u(q, θ).
A detailed proof of the above proposition, including a constructive proof of existence,
is provided in our companion paper Martimort and Stole (2010a). The mathematical
intuition, however, can be understood in terms of SGM programs for aggregate games
presented above. Economically, the proposition indicates that there is a multiple
marginalization, just as in the case of intrinsic agency.
To interpret the result, suppose that the game is one of private provision of public
goods. In this case, N = A, and a principal is active precisely when f(θ)si >
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1 − F (θ). For any type agent for whom m principals are active, there will be an
m-fold marginalization of information rents. One can further show that if qS(θ) is the
allocation chosen in an intrinsic game with principals S ⊆ N (and q∅(θ) = 0), then
the equilibrium allocation in the delegated game is
q(θ) = max
S⊆N
qS(θ).
In the case of conflict among the principals, the result is more subtle. Suppose that
n = 2 and that each principal is a lobbyist trying to influence a politician’s choice of q.
Let s1 > 0 > s2 represent the preference conflict and θ represent the agent’s preference
for q where we now assume θ is uniformly distributed over the set [−∆,∆]. Martimort
and Stole (2010a) establish that the monotone, smooth equilibrium is characterized
by two critical types, θ1 and θ2, with the property that an agent with type θ ∈
[−∆,min{θ1, θ2}) is influenced only by principal 2, an agent θ ∈ (max{θ1, θ2},∆] is
influenced only by principal 1, and if θ1 < θ2 (which will be the case for ∆ sufficiently
small), then types in the interval (θ1, θ2) are influenced by both principals. In the dual-
influence region, the agent’s action is doubly-distorted away from efficient allocation.
6. AGGREGATE GAMES AND POTENTIAL GAMES
We conclude this paper with a brief review of the connections between various
notions of potential games and the aggregate game concepts developed in this paper.
The connection between aggregate and potential games is loose, but their contrast
serves to illuminate the key features of aggregate games and their characteristic self-
generating programs.
Recalling Monderer and Shapley (1996), a game G={N, (Xi)i∈N , (ui)i∈N} is said to
be an (exact) potential game if there exists a potential function P : X→ R such
that for every player i ∈ N and for every profile x−i ∈ X−i,
ui(xi,x−i)− ui(x′i,x−i) = P(xi,x−i)− P(x′i,x−i).
G is said to be an ordinal potential game if there exists a function P : X → R
such that for every player i ∈ N and for every profile x−i ∈ X−i,
ui(xi,x−i)− ui(x′i,x−i) > 0 ⇐⇒ P(xi,x−i)− P(x′i,x−i) > 0.
Clearly every exact potential game is an ordinal potential game.
An even weaker notion than an ordinal potential is that of a best-response potential
developed in Voorneveld (2000). A game G is a best-response potential game if
there exists a function P : X → R such that for every player i ∈ N and for every
profile x−i ∈ X−i,
arg max
xi∈Xi
ui(xi,x−i) = arg max
xi∈Xi
P(xi,x−i).
Morris and Ui (2004) use a best-response equivalence relation to construct and char-
acterize this quotient space for more general games. In the sense of such equivalence
classes, G is a best-response potential game precisely when it is best-response equiv-
alent to an “identical-interest” or “coordination” game,
Gˆ = {N, (Xi)i∈N , (P)i∈N}.
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Of course, the sets of Nash equilibria for G and Gˆ coincide whenever such an equiva-
lence holds.
In the most general definition of an aggregate game, the defining requirement is the
existence of an aggregate function φ : X→ Y such that preferences can be represented
as ui : Xi × Y → R. The equilibrium set of every best-response potential game (and
hence every ordinal and exact potential game) coincides with the equilibrium set of
the identical-interest game Gˆ. Note that a coordination game is itself an aggregate
game upon substituting φ(x) = P(x) and ui(xi, φ(x)) = P(x). We may thus conclude
that every best-response potential game G has an aggregate-game representation Gˆ
that is faithful to the set of Nash equilibria. The class of aggregate games is therefore
decidedly larger than the class of best-response potential games and the principle of
aggregate concurrence in Theorem 1 has broader applications.34
It is illuminating to draw out the implications of the aggregate concurrence principle
when applied to a best-response potential game. Clearly, any x ∈ arg maxx∈X P(x)
is a Nash equilibrium. The set of P maximizers, however, is possibly a proper subset
of the equilibria to G. Indeed, Theorem 1 informs us that the entire set of Nash
equilibrium aggregate values is characterized by the self-generating program
P(x) ∈
⋂
i∈N
arg max
y∈P(Xi,x−i)
y,
or more simply
P(x) = max
x∈X
1
n
∑
i∈N
P(Xi,x−i).
Stated this way, the possibility of coordination failures arising in equilibrium is evi-
dent.
The previous argument suggests that even in linear aggregate games for which
there exists a common payoff Λ(y, y) that represents the players’ preferences of y ∈
X relative to y, we cannot conclude that the there is a common payoff function
(a best-response potential), P(y), that (i) depends only upon y and (ii) faithfully
represents all of the equilibria in the original game. Typically, for Λ(y, y) to be written
independently of y, either an equilibrium refinement or a restriction on strategy spaces
must be introduced. For example, recalling the case of intrinsic common agency, one
can restrict attention to equilibria in smooth tariffs (alternatively, we could restrict
the strategy spaces in the original game). In this case, (5.8) reduces to the simpler
program
(q, U) ∈ arg max
(q,U)∈IC
P(q, U),
where
P(q, U) =
∫
Θ
{(∑
i∈N
vi(q) + u(q, θ)
)
− nU
}
dF (θ).
34The smaller classes of linear aggregate games and exact potential games are non-nested. First,
it is well known that the game of Cournot is an exact potential game only if market demand curve
is linear; the only requirement on cost functions is that they are differentiable. The Cournot game is
a linear aggregate game, however, only if each firm’s cost function is affine, but there are no similar
restrictions on demand; indeed, demand can be discontinuous.
30 D. MARTIMORT, L. STOLE
Thus, the intrinsic agency game restricted to differentiable tariffs is a best-response
potential game, but we are unable to make such a statement about the entire class
of intrinsic common agency games. One of the contributions of the present paper is
to demonstrate that regardless, aggregate games have a simple SGM characterization
derived from preferences over aggregate strategies.
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APPENDIX
Proof of Lemma 1: The right-hand side represents player i’s strategic problem as
an equivalent two-stage maximization program over the space of aggregates. First,
for any given aggregate y, the player chooses the best xi from the set of choices that
implement y given x−i. Thus, xi ∈ φ−1i (y,x−i). Denote the value function for this
step as
Ui(y,x−i) ≡ max
xi∈φ−1i (y,x−i)
ui(xi, y).
If φ is pairwise-injective, then this step is trivial as φ−1i (y,x−i) is therefore a single-
valued correspondence and Ui(y,x−i) = ui(φ−1i (y,x−i),x−i). In the second stage, the
player chooses the best aggregate in the set of all implementable aggregates, given
x−i; that is, y is chosen from the set φ(Xi,x−i) to maximize Ui(y,x−i). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 1: Applying Corollary 2, if y is an equilibrium aggregate,
it must maximize Λ(y, y) over the set of feasible aggregates given the equilibrium
aggregate y strategy profile,
y ∈ Y(y) ≡
⋂
i∈N
{y | ∃zi ∈ Xi s.t. y = y + zi}
where we have used the property that Xi = Xi − {xi}. In words, the set of feasible
aggregates is the set of variations from y that are restricted to a single signal.
Because Λ(·, y) is strictly concave and Θ is a convex set, any solution to the SGM
program
y ∈ arg max
y∈Y(y)
Λ(y, y),
must satisfy the first-order conditions for each permissible variation. It is thus nec-
essary that that for each i ∈ N , the first-order condition for the variation y(s) =
y(s) + zi(si) must be satisfied at zi = 0. Thus, for each i,
0 ∈ arg max
zi∈Xi
Λ(y + zi, y).
In the context of beauty-contest games, the expression Λ(y + zi, y) specializes to
−
∫
Θ×Σ
{
1
2
(y(s) + zi(si))
2 (κ+ (n− 1))
− (y(s) + zi(si)) (y(s)(n− 1) + κ θ0)
}
dG(θ0, s).
Eliminating all terms that do not involve zi, we have the simpler requirement that
0 ∈ arg min
zi∈Xi
∫
Θ×Σ
(
κ zi(si)(y(s)− θ0) + 1
2
zi(si)
2(κ+ (n− 1))
)
dG(θ0, s).
Suppose that κ 6= 0. Then the first-order necessary condition evaluated at zi(si) = 0
yields ∫
Θ×Σ
(y(s)− θ0) dG(θ0, s) = 0,
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as required.
Suppose instead that κ = 0. Then the first-order conditions of the aggregate pro-
gram no longer imply aggregate unbiasedness. Nonetheless, there exists at least one
equilibrium with an unbiased aggregate. Consider the linear equilibrium in which
player i chooses the strategy xi(si) = aiE[θ0 | si] + (1− ai)E[θ0]. By construction, the
associated aggregate is unbiased. To see that such a linear equilibrium exists, note
that the first-order condition for each player i requires that xi(si) is a linear function
of E[θ0 | si] and E[
∑
j 6=i xj(sj) | si]. If the other players choose linear strategies, then
the unique optimal choice for player i is also a linear function of E[θ0 | si] and (n−1)-
terms, E[sj | si]. Given that these conditional expectations are linear in si, we obtain
that xi is linear in si. Given that αi is bounded above so that ψi > 0, the system
of first-order linear equations has full rank and can be inverted to obtain a unique
profile of (a1, . . . , an) which supports this unbiased linear equilibrium. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3: Given Corollary 4, we need only to show that
EY (G) ⊆
{
T |T ∈ arg max
T∈T
Λ(T, T )
}
.
Suppose not. Then there is a T ∈ EY (G) and a Tˆ ∈ T such that
Λ(Tˆ , T ) > Λ(T , T ).
Let (T 1, . . . , T n) be the equilibrium offers which generate T and define Tˆi ≡ Tˆ − T−i.
Because Λ is the sum of the players’ payoff functions, there must exist some player i
such that∫
Q
(vi(q)− Tˆi(q))dH(q | Tˆi + T−i) >∫
Q
(vi(q)− T i(q))dH(q |T i + T−i)
= max
Ti∈T
∫
Q
(vi(q) − Ti(q))dH(q |Ti + T−i).
The latter equality is implied by the hypothesis that T i is an equilibrium strategy
against T−i. Given that Tˆi yields greater payoff than T i, it follows that Tˆi 6∈ T .
The following lemma provides the key technical step in establishing a contradiction
with the optimality of T i over T .
Lemma 3 Suppose Ω is a compact subset of Rk, (Ω, d) is a metric space and (Ω,Σ, µ)
is a probability space. For any bounded, lower-semicontinuous function, f : Ω → R,
there exist a sequence of upper-semicontinuous functions (fm)m∈N such that fm(ω)↗
f(ω) for each ω ∈ Ω, and there exists a corresponding sequence of open sets, (Om)m∈N,
such that for each m ∈ N, f(ω) = fm(ω) for ω ∈ Ω \ Om and limm→∞ µ (Om) = 0.
Proof of Lemma: Denote the discontinuity points of f by the set Ω0 and a typ-
ical element as ω0. For each such point ω0, we construct a ε-neighborhood entirely
contained in Ω:
Bε(ω0) = {ω ∈ Ω | d(ω0, ω) < ε} .
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Bε(ω0) is an open set in Ω. Define the open covering of Ω0 as
Bε =
⋃
ω0∈Ω0
Bε(ω0).
From Bε we remove the discontinuity points of Ω0 and denote the resulting set
Oε = Bε \ Ω0.
Because Ω0 is a closed set in Ω, the set Oε is open in Ω and its complement Ω \Oε is
closed. By construction, f is continuous on Ω \ Oε.
We next construct an ε-approximation to f as
fε(ω) =
{
f(ω), ω ∈ Ω \ Oε,
f , ω ∈ Oε,
where f is sufficiently small so that f ≤ infω∈Oε f(ω). Because f is bounded, such an
f exists. Thus, we have constructed a function that is continuous when restricted to
the closed subset Ω \ Oε and also continuous when restricted to the open subset Oε.
Choose a sequence (ωk) which traverses a boundary from Ω \ Oε to Oε. At the
boundary, the function fε(ωk) jumps downward. Because fε is a continuous function
on the closed set Ω\Oε and a continuous function on the open set Oε, it follows that fε
is upper semi-continuous at such discontinuity points. Similarly, when (ωk) traverses
the boundary going from Oε to Ω \Oε, the approximation fε(ωk) jumps upward from
a continuous function defined on an open set to a continuous function defined on
a closed set. We conclude that the approximation fε is upper semi-continuous on
Ω. Abusing slightly our notation, we set ε = 1
m
and redefine the sequence of upper
semicontinuous approximations in terms of m ∈ N. This sequence, (fm)m∈N, converges
to f from below as m→∞.
To establish that limm→∞ µ (Om) = 0 (here we again substitute ε with 1m and
retask the notation), it is sufficient to note that the sequence of open sets (Om)m∈N in
Σ decreases to ∅, and thus the probability measure µ(Om)↘ 0 as required. Q.E.D.
Returning to the main task, we wish to show that an upper-semicontinuous approx-
imation to Tˆi = Tˆ − T−i exists, Tˆmi , for which∫
Q
(vi(q)− Tˆmi (q))dH(q | Tˆmi + T−i) >
∫
Q
(vi(q)− T i(q))dH(q |T i + T−i).
The previous lemma establishes that a sequence of u.s.c. approximations exists for
the lower-semicontinuous function, −T−i, which we denote (−Tm−i)m∈N. Thus, we can
set Tˆmi = Tˆ + (−Tm−i) and construct (Tˆmi )m∈N as a sequence of upper semi-continuous
approximations to Tˆi such that Tˆ
m
i ↗ Tˆi.
Using the approximation in the proof of the Lemma, the aggregate sequence Tˆm =
Tˆmi + T−i is given by
Tˆm(q) =
{
Tˆ (q), q ∈ Q \ Om
t, q ∈ Om,
where t is a constant satisfying t ≤ inf q˜∈Q Tˆ (q˜), and Om is an open set which can be
made arbitrarily small.
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Because Tˆm ≤ Tˆ with equality on q 6∈ Om, revealed preference implies
q0(θ, Tˆ ) 6∈ Om ⇒ q0(θ, Tˆm) = q0(θ, Tˆ ).
Given that µ(Om)→ 0, we have pointwise convergence
q0(θ, Tˆ
m(q))→ q0(θ, Tˆ (q)),
Prob
(
θ ∈ Θ | q0(θ, Tˆ ) ∈ Om
)
→ 0,
and H(· | Tˆm) converges in distribution to H(· | Tˆ ).
Consider the limiting payoff to player i from playing Tˆmi ∈ T :
lim inf
m→∞
∫
Q
(vi(q)− Tˆmi (q))dH(q | Tˆmi + T−i).
Because Tˆmi ≤ Tˆi, a lower bound to the limiting payoff is
lim inf
m→∞
∫
Q
(vi(q)− Tˆi(q))dH(q | Tˆmi + T−i).
Because H(· | Tˆm) converges in distribution to H(· | Tˆ ), the limit of this lower bound
exists and is ∫
Q
(vi(q)− Tˆi(q))dH(q | Tˆi + T−i),
which exceeds ∫
Q
(vi(q)− T i(q))dH(q |T ).
Thus, T i cannot be a best response to T−i, contradicting the hypothesis that T ∈
EY (G). Q.E.D.
Extension: Intrinsic common-agency games with general incomplete infor-
mation:
We demonstrate how one can introduce more complex incomplete information struc-
tures and still obtain some of the the key results in Theorems 1 and 2. In particular, we
generalize the application of intrinsic common agency to allow for private information
by the agent and the principals.35
Suppose that each principal has a private type, si ∈ Si, i ∈ N . This is in addition to
the agent’s type, denoted θ ∈ Θ. Each principal’s benefit function is vi : Q×Si → R.
For simplicity, we require that Q, Θ and each Si are finite and ordered. Let (θ, s) ∈
Θ× S be jointly distributed according to G.
Each principal i chooses a behavioral strategy that is a bounded transfer function,
Ti : Q×Si → R, which is optimal given the eventual realization of his private type, si.
This strategy set is denoted by Ti for each player. Denote T (q, s) =
∑
i∈N Ti(q, si) and
35The full treatment of Bayesian games between informed principals is outside of the scope of this
paper. On this, see Martimort and Moreira (2010).
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T ∈ T , where T is the set of aggregate transfers that are feasible for some strategy
profile:
T =
{
T : Q× S→ R
∣∣∣∣∣∃(Ti, . . . , Tn) ∈ T1 × · · · × Tn, T = ∑
i∈N
Ti
}
.
Notice that this game is a weakly-symmetric distributional game with distribution
function given by
H(q, s|T ) = Prob
(
θ˜ ∈ Θ, s˜ ∈ S
∣∣∣ q0(θ˜, T (·, s˜)) ≤ q, s˜ ≤ s) .
If the players’ strategy spaces were identical, this would be a strongly-symmetric
distributional game.
Principal i chooses Ti to maximize (for any realization of type, si)
max
Ti∈Ti
∫
Q×S
(vi(q, si)− Ti(q, si))dH(q, s |Ti + T−i).
Theorem 1 immediately provides that
(q0, T 1, . . . , T n) ∈ E(G) ⇐⇒ T ∈
⋂
i∈N
arg max
T∈Ti+{T−i}
ui(T − T−i, T ).
The aggregate in this game is not pairwise bijective because of the measurability
restrictions on the aggregate that each player can individually induce. That said, we
can nonetheless establish the necessary condition in Theorem 2. To this end, define
the aggregate welfare function (analogous to (5.6)) as
Λ(T, T ) =
∫
Q×S
(∑
i∈N
vi(q, θi)− T (q, s) + (n− 1)
(
T (q, s)− T (q, s)))) dH(q, s |T ).
Immediately, Theorem 2 implies that any equilibrium aggregate, T ∈ T1 + · · · + Tn,
must solve the following SGM program:
T ∈ arg max
T∈∩i∈NTi+{T−i}
Λ(T, T ).
This result is similar in spirit to the necessary condition for beauty contest games
which delivered the “unbiased aggregate” result. Unfortunately, it is difficult to say
more without placing additional structure on the aggregate game. In terms of suffi-
ciency, we cannot appeal to Theorem 3 because the players’ strategy spaces are not
identical and hence the game is not strongly symmetric. Nevertheless, the fact that
the more complex incomplete information games have a structure similar to the SGM
program derived from (5.6) leaves us hopeful that these aggregate techniques will be
of use in an even larger class of applications.
36 D. MARTIMORT, L. STOLE
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